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Restructuring In The Hospitality Industry
Abstract
In her dialogue entitled - Restructuring in the Hospitality Industry - Elisa S. Moncarz, Associate Professor, the
School of Hospitality Management at Florida International University, intends for you to know the following:
“Recent years have seen a proliferation of restructurings of major American corporations creating an
extremely important issue that has affected U.S. business. This article discusses restructuring issues in the
hospitality industry, focusing attention on its causes and motivations, as well as on its benefits and perils. The
author considers the impact of restructuring on investors and management while examining recent
restructurings involving hospitality firms.”
In defining the concept of restructuring, Associate Professor Moncarz informs you, “Restructuring entails the
implementation of fundamental and comprehensive modification of a company's operational and/or financial
structure.”
“It has, indeed, become fashionable to take a company apart and put it back together in a different form,” the
author says. Additionally, Moncarz refers to a Wall Street Journal study, dated August 1985, which reveals that
nearly half the large American corporations were, or were soon to be restructured in the 1984/85 time frame.
There are several distinct types of restructurings and the author wants you to be aware of some of them.
“…threats of takeover attempts, the larger part of all restructuring have been initiated willingly in order to
expand or divest a company's line of business (i.e., operational restructurings) or redirect its finances (i.e.,
financial restructurings),” the author reveals.
“Two principal types of operational restructurings are mergers and acquisitions [M&A], and divestitures
[disposing of unwanted units or assets],” Moncarz further defines the concepts of expansion and divestiture.
The author explains several types of financial restructuring sketches used in the hospitality industry, including
stock re-purchasing, debt issuances and redemptions, swapping debt for equity, and effective theories of
realigning debt through extending loans and/or revising terms.
To expand their businesses, Moncarz makes anecdotal reference to several major food and beverage
corporations that have successfully employed operational restructuring principles.
The author wades into the shallow end of the hostile takeover pool by explaining some of the corporate
restructuring concepts used to repel that aggressive technique. Walt Disney Company completely redesigned
their entire upper level management structure in a successful effort to thwart a hostile takeover bid by
corporate raider Saul P. Steinberg, Moncarz informs.
To close, the author touches on leveraged buyouts [LBOs], and stock repurchases to divest unwanted
divisions and immobilize hostile takeover attempts. A lengthy table of - Selected Restructurings in the
Hospitality Industry [1982 to date of article] – is also included.
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Restructuring In The Hospitality Industry 
by 
Elisa S. Moncarz 
Associate Professor 
School of Hospitality Management 
Florida International University 
Recent years have seen a proliferation of restructurings ofmajorAmerican 
cor~orations, creatina an extremely important issue that has affected U.S. 
business.  his articl~discusses restructuring issues in the hospitality in- 
dustry, focusing attention on its causes and motivations, as well as on its 
benefits and perils. The author considers the impact of restructuring on 
investors and management while examining recent restructurings involv- 
ing hospitality firms. 
Restructuring has exploded into a major happening that has surely 
transformed much of U.S. industry in therecent past. An unprecedented 
rise in restructurings of American corporations has been attributed to 
low interest rates, the Reagan administration's permissive antitrust and 
regulatory climate, a ready supply of financing, and a reasonably good 
economy over the past couple of years. Moreover, tax incentives in the 
form of liberal investment tax credits and accelerated recovery of pro- 
perty and equipment have also contributed to the restructure of com- 
panies, providing an additional source of inexpensive financing. 
Restructuring entails the implementation of fundamental and com- 
prehensive modification~ of a company's operational andlor financial 
structure. I t  has, indeed, become fashionable to take a company apart 
and put it back together in adifferent form. According to arecent study 
reported in the Wall Street Journal in August 1985,' nearly half the 
large American corporations were restructured in 1984 and 1985 (or were 
soon to be restructured). These corporate transformations are reshap- 
ing the appearance of hospitality industry firms, raising broad concerns 
since in many instances the deals are heavily financed with debt. On the 
positive side, however, these restructurings have enabled the eradica- 
tion of feeble, inefficient operations while placing corporate strategies 
into proper perspective. 
More Restructurings Have Been Voluntary 
Although some restructuring plans have been made under existing 
or potential threats of takeover attempts, the larger part of all restruc- 
turing~ have been initiated willingly in order to expand or divest a com- 
pany's line of business (i.e., operational restructurings) or redirect its 
finances (i.e., financial restructurings). 
Two principal types of operational restructurings are mergers and ac- 
quisitions (M&A) and divestitures (disposing of unwanted units or 
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assets). According to securities data,2 mergers and acquisitions activi- 
ty set record levels in 1985, reaching $175 billion from $116.7 billion in 
1984 referred to as "theyear of the megamergers." Analysts believe that 
this trend will moderate in 1986 due to high stock prices and a falling 
dollar. Yet, continued acquisitions of companies with established brand 
names and more divestitures of unwanted units and divisions are 
foreseen. 
A widely used method of financial restructuring has been the stock 
repurchase programs which have resulted in companies buying back 
648.9 million shares of their own common stock with an approximate 
value of $32.01 billion during the period from January 1984 to July 1985. 
Other forms of financial restructuringused by hospitality firms include 
debt issuances and redemptions, swapping debt for equity, and realigning 
debt (e.g., extending loans and revising terms.) 
Mergers and Acquisitions Play Important Role 
Over the past decade several food and beverage companies, such as 
Pillsbury, Pepsico and General Mills, have been involved in maj or M&A 
activity in the food service segment of the hospitality industry, motivated 
by the desire to become more recession proof and attracted by the relative 
ly higher returns of the restaurant business. This diversification trend 
has resulted in the acquiring companies utilizing the acquired restaurant 
concepts as major expansion vehicles. 
Traditionally, the restaurants were successful concepts, well positioned 
and ready for growth. Morerecently, however, a few conglomerates and 
some of the stronger food service chains have acquired (or merged) other 
smaller, but growing restaurant operators who were in need of capital 
for expansion. Also, matured franchisors have been purchasing fran- 
chisees, whereas other established restaurants (and some lodging chains) 
have been buying into new geographic areas through M&A rather than 
by building them. Accordingly, a substantial portion of the recent M&A 
activity has been the result of disappointing sales and accumulated losses 
whereby stronger companies seek to acquire struggling chains while tak- 
ing advantage of their net operating tax loss carry-forwards. 
Pillsbury Made Series of Major Acquisitions 
The diversification strategy followed by Pillsbury Co. since 1967 was 
intended to enable the food processor firm to continue to grow and ex- 
pand in the face of decreasing sales of its Green Giant vegetables and 
refrigerated dough products. To that end, Pillsbury made a series of 
significant food service acquisitions into such companies as Burger King, 
Steak and Ale, and Bennigan's. Among the more recent acquisitions are 
Haagen Dam, Van de Kamp, and Diversifoods. 
The Diversifoods $390 million acquisition, which was completed in 
1985, became a significant contributor to the 22 percent increasein food 
service earnings (and a 30 percent revenue growth) reported by Pillsbury 
Co. for the first quarter of its 1986 fiscal year. Indeed, Pillsbury's food 
service division has grown into the company's major line of business, 
comprising over 50 percent of Pillsbury 's sales and exceeding 70 percent 
of its earnings for the first quarter of the 1986 fiscal year.3 
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Currently, Pillsbury Co. is involved in substantial restructuring ac- 
tivity in the form of repositioning, consolidating, expanding and divesting 
severalelements of its diverse restaurant holdings. In this regard, amajor 
consolidation of the franchised Burger King units and the Godfather's 
pizza chain, which were part of the Diversifoods acquisition, was recently 
completed by Pillsbury. Conversely, at the end of 1985 Pillsbury sold 
the Chart House chain (also part of the Diversifoods acquisition) in a 
leveraged buyout (LBO) that included several members of Chart House's 
top managemenL4 
Saga Becomes Multi-Faceted Company 
Typical of the trend toward food service acquisitions has been the 
growth of Saga Corp., which successfully expanded beyond its earlier 
reliance on institutional food service to become a diversified company 
that comprised such restaurant concepts as Black Angus steakhouses, 
Velvet Turtledinnerhouses, Spoon hamburger cafes, and Grandy 's fried 
chicken restaurants. Indeed, restaurants account for alrnos t 40 percent 
of Saga's revenue. 
During the earlier 1980s a major operational restructuring program 
was undertaken by Saga in order to focus attention on the continued 
growth and diversification of its restaurant segment. This program in- 
cluded the elimination of one whole level of management, moving its cor- 
porate managers into new positions while creating a four-man office of 
the president, thus strengthening the company's position and increas- 
ing its efficiency. For several years this corporate restructuring was 
rewarding, and earnings increased to $29.1 million on revenues of $1.3 
billion in the 1984 fiscal year. 
But lately Saga's performance has been disappointing, with declin- 
ing earnings stemming from lower customer counts, increased restaurant 
costs, andmanagement judgmental factors. Moreover, analysts had been 
speculating that Saga's stock was undervalued since Saga had been 
trading in the $20 per share range despite an estimated breakup value 
of at least $40 per share. Because of this, Saga had been suggested as 
a likely candidate for a takeover or LBO. In May 1986, Marriott Corp. 
offered $34 a share to acquire all the Saga's common stock, for a total 
of $435.2 This original "friendly offer'' was ignored by Saga's 
management, prompting Marriott to launch a tender offer of $34 a share, 
hoping to become the nation's largest provider of institutional food ser- 
vice. The market reacted to this offer by increasing Saga's market price 
to $37 per share (above Marriott's offer), suggesting the possibility of 
a higher bid.6 
Some Restructurings Avoid Takeovers 
~ l t h o u ~ h  most MM'S begin and end on friendly terms, there has been 
an escalation in corporate restructurings triggered by the desire to evade 
a hostile takeover. This has resulted in the dramatic transformation of 
these firms after repelling corporate raiders (also known as sharks). 
In seeking to defend a company against potential takeover attempts, 
management may try a variety of tactics designed to lessen the attrac- 
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tiveness of the target company. These anti-takeover defenses are often 
instituted through bylaw or corporate charter changes. They include: 
establishing different classes of directors and staggering their terms 
abolishing cumulative voting 
creating an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), which may be 
used as defense of a contested takeover attempt 
reincorporating in a state with an anti-takeover statute 
establishing a super majority vote (from 50 to 100 percent) for cer- 
tain corporate transactions, including mergers, acquisitions, sale of 
assets and divestitures 
At the end of 1985, over 60 percent of the Standard and Poor's 500 
companies had adopted some sort of deterrent, and many mid-sized com- 
panies were considering anti-takeover devices, fearing that they may also 
become targets of takeover attempts. 
A very popular shark-repellent practice has been the authorization of 
new shares either by a stock split or as a poison defense. In 1985 a 
Delaware Supreme Court ruled that poison pill anti-takeover devices that 
give shareholders of a target company the right to purchase suitor's 
shares at bargain prices were legal. This decision has provpked a pro- 
liferation of companies adopting such measures (e.g., McDonald's, 
Ralston Purina, Jerrico). In a February 1986 Hotel and Motel Manage- 
ment article,' Anthony G. Marshall, nationally-acclaimed legal expert 
and dean of the Florida International University School of Hospitality 
Management, warned that the adoption of poison bill defenses may not 
be an effective practice in all cases since the Delaware decision did not 
guarantee the legality of all poison pills or that other states would be 
bound by Delaware law. 
Recent Takeover Activity Caused by Conflicts 
Michael C. Jensen of Harvard Business School noted in a 1986 New 
York Times8 article that the dominant cause for the recent takeover ac- 
tivity has been the tension between management and shareholders over 
the payout of cash in excess of that required to fund all the company's 
projects that would serve to maximize shareholder values. Based on this 
contention, Jensen feels that the prime takeover candidates are of two 
kinds: 
companies with poor management and disappointing results 
companies that have done 'exceptionally well and have large cash 
flows that they do not pay out to shareholders 
Accordingly, deregulated industries (e.g., airlines) and industries 
generating high cash flows with low growth opportunities (food, tobac- 
co, and capital intensive ihdustries) have been prime candidates for 
takeover and restructuring activity. 
There has been much criticism of restructuring activity associated with 
existing and potential hostile takeover attempts because of the over- 
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whelming debt load-typically in the form of high yield, high risk "junk 
securities." This makes the target company more vulnerable to economic 
downturns. Besides, after repelling the raiders, corporate cash flow 
becomes directed toward the repayment of the debt rather than toward 
investments needed to make future growth possible. 
On the other hand, many observers feel that when management feels 
the pressure of potential hostile takeovers, shareholders and the economy 
would normally gain since management would not be free to waste 
resources, thereby opening new opportunities by forcing these companies 
to become more competitive and efficient. Hence, many companies may 
actually be better off for the restructuring changes following hostile 
takeover attempts. Allen Jacobs of M.I.T. estimates that $242 billion 
in potential gains through restructurings in the 43 largest companies 
were possible as of January 1985 from eliminating inefficiencies. 
Moreover, if we use stock prices as a measure of corporate performance, 
we can see that takeover activity has caused extraordinary increases in 
market prices of pertinent companies. In 1985 takeovers and other 
restructurings have provided more than $1 billion in profits to 
shareholders of target companies. Similarly, 4.7 percentage points of the 
31.6 percent rise in the stock market came from acquisitions and 
restructurings. 
Walt Disney Company Provides An Excellent Example 
In 1984 Walt Disney Company was the center of a controversial 
takeover battle. After halting the takeover attempt of corporate raider 
Saul P. Steinberg (making a $325 million greenmail payment), Walt 
Disney Company initiated a major corporate restructuring program9 
that resulted in the arrival of a new management team comprised of 60 
executives headed by Michael D. Eisner, chief executive officer andchair- 
man of the board. The new management team adopted various restruc- 
turing measures, including the discontinuation of certain projects and 
the reevaluation and analysis of several options for future growth. 
Since the restructuring program was implemented in 1984, Walt 
Disney has done quite well, with shares trading well above the raider's 
offer. In fact, Walt Disney Company has seen its stock rise by over 300 
percent after making the appropriate adjustments for stock splits. 
Other Hospitality Firms Also Affected 
Hostile takeovers in the restaurant business were once unimaginable. 
At the present time, however, that is no longer the case, mainly because 
of the distressed sales that have made struggling chains a target to 
stronger companies. In 1985 an unsolicited takeover attempt was made 
by USA Cafes (owner of the Bonanza steakhouse chain), offering a $16 
a share bid for the Ponderosa steakhouse chain. Ponderosaresisted the 
attempt and succeeded when USA Cafes abandoned the endeavor in 
November 1985. Still, USA Cafes continued to support a possible merger 
of both companies, emphasizing the benefits to Ponderosa's manage- 
ment, franchisees, and employees. 
Recently, there has been speculation of takeover attempts on well- 
established restaurant chains such as McDonalds, Wendy's, and Church 
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Fried Chicken. As aresult, the stock prices of these companies have ex- 
perienced major movements in an upward direction during the pertinent 
period of time. 
Discarding Divisions Has Become Popular 
Following the M&A boom of the past few years, anurnber of companies 
have been anxious to streamline their operations with the focus on in- 
creasing profitability and enhancing the firm's value. Accordingly, 
several conglomerates and other major corporations have been r e  
evaluating their commitments to the hospitality industry, disillusion- 
ed with the need for more expertise, personal attention, and service than 
they are willing to provide. 
As part of this refocusing trend among conglomerates and some ma- 
jor hospitality corporations, several companies have used the divesting 
approach of disposing of unwanted divisions that no longer fit the cor- 
porate strategies of the public companies that own them. These 
divestitures have involved outright sale of assets and units, LBOs, and 
liquidations. In this manner, companies can concentrate in the core 
business they know best. Generally, management perceives the divested 
divisions to be more valuable when they are sold singly because of the 
breakup value (a measure of the individual prices that the market would 
place on the components of a firm). The parts are worth more than the 
whole. The effect of determining a high breakup value for a company has 
been responsible for the tremendous rise in stock market prices when 
such a company considers the possibility of divesting itself of units or 
divisions. 
Holiday Corp.'s 1982 sale of Delta Steamship lines to Cowley Maritime 
Corp. serves as an example of a divestiture of aline of business that was 
proving to be a financial burden to Holiday Corp. due to economic pro- 
blems in the countries serviced by the steamship lines, in its poor per- 
formance and declining returns. Moreover, the sale of Delta Steamship 
lines was the culmination of Holiday Corp. 's seven-year strategy to divest 
non-hospitality operations. The $96 million proceeds from the Delta sale 
were used to improve and expand the company's overall position in the 
hospitality industry and to reduce its floating-rate debt. 
Imperial Group Divests Itself Of Howard Johnson's 
In December 1979 Imperial Group PLC, a leading British con- 
glomerate, paid $630 million to acquire Howard Johnson Corp. in an at- 
tempt to participate in the booming American food and lodging business. 
In November 1985, the British conglomerate perceived the sale of the 
financially burdensome Howard Johnson's chain so desirable that they 
sold it (except for the Ground Round division) to Marriott Corp for $300 
million, including the assumption of $138 million in debt. Imperial had 
failed to accomplish its goal of straightening out the chain and revers- 
ing a deteriorating trend that kept the company stagnant and unable 
to reach its full potential. The Ground Round chain remained Imperial's 
only operation in the U.S. and was to be expanded by increasing the 
number of franchised units.1° 
By contrast, Imperial's divestiture of Howard Johnson's was well 
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received by Marriott's shareholders since the purchase price was con- 
sidered a real bargain. In addition, Marriott decided to keep only the 
Howard Johnson's company-owned restaurants, selling the lodging pro 
perties and the franchise system to Prime Motor Inns. As a result, the 
net acquisition price to Marriott was reduced to $65 million. Marriott 
plans to convert the acquired restaurants into its Big Boy concept, mak- 
ing them more valuable since the average sales per unit for the Howard 
Johnson's restaurants is only $750,000, whereas the Big Boy's average 
is about $1.1 million sales per unit.ll 
LBOS widely Used As Restructuring Device 
Leveraged buyouts (LBOs) have become a very popular restructur- 
ing device for 
divestitures of unwanted divisions 
halting hostile takeover attempts 
taking private undervalued public companies that have strong and 
competent management 
LBOs provide a unique opportunity for talented managers to own and 
operate the business they are currently managing. They have produced 
productivity gains since the great appeal to management is that he or 
she changes from an employee to an entrepreneur and, therefore, becomes 
more committed, deriving increased productivity to the company. 
A major feature of a LBO is the restructuring of corporate ownership 
by replacing the entire public stock interest with full equity ownership 
by a private consortium of top management, investment bankers, and 
institutional investors. The return to private ownership (going private) 
enables management to concentrate more on long-term goals without 
regard to the short-run orientation of the stock market or the potential 
impact of business decisions on earnings per share. 
LBOs have been very rewarding to managerslentrepreneurs and to 
investment bankers because of the impressive returns received by al l  
participants. Also, selling shareholders have been able to liquify assets 
while earning substantial premiums. Still, LBOs involve tremendous risk 
since they are heavily financed with debt. SEC chairman John R. Shad 
noted, "The greater the leverage, the greater the risks to the company, 
its shareholders and creditors." Shad further warned "the more leveraged 
takeovers and buyouts today, the more bankruptcies tomorrow."12 
A recent surge of LBOs in the hospitality industry executed in 1985 
included the Denny's, ARA Services, and Chart House. Denny's was 
considered well suited for a buyout among restaurant companies because 
of its strong financial position, undervalued assets, and high cash flow 
generation. Besides, Denny's had experienced remarkable expansion and 
increased profitability, and its management team was perceived as one 
of the most competent and respected in the restaurant industry.13 
Faced with the prospects of slower expansion following the LBO, Den- 
ny's reversed a company trend that began in 1970 which was averse to 
the use of franchising as an expansion technique, and initiated a selec- 
tive program of restaurant franchising. This was expected to maintain 
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Denny's expansion while generating franchise fees and continuing sales 
royalties to aid the service of the huge debt associated with the LBO. 
In addition, Denny's laid off portions of its headquarters and field super- 
visory personnel and closed one of its 16 regional offices during 1985. 
More recently, W.R. Grace & Co., a large specialty chemical company, 
has considered disposing of a controlling interest in its diversified 
restaurant group in a LBO under the direction of Anwar Soliman, ex- 
ecutive vice president in charge of Graces's restaurant group. W.R. Grace 
& Co. would retain a 49 percenb interest in the restaurant group. The pro- 
ceeds from this divesting interest, which are expected to exceed $500 
million, would be used to repay Grace's long-term debt in order to for- 
tify its financial position, and for its open m&ket stock repurchase 
program.14 
Stock Repurchases Become Popular 
A very popular form of financial restructuring that has been running 
at record pace is the repurchase of acompany's shares of common stock. 
Typically, these stock buybacks occur when a company has some 
available cash or uses funds produced through other means (e.g., 
divestitures) to increase the holding of its own shares, thereby decreas- 
ing the amount of shares outstanding. 
A repurchase program could be part of an overall restructuring effort 
or it could be used to reduce the effects of stock dilution. Another reason 
for implementing a stock repurchase program would be to avoid an un- 
solicited takeover attempt or to buy out specific shareholders. Moreover, 
stock buybacks have been undertaken in order to increase the market 
value of a stock when a company feels it is undervalued. The stock 
enhancement results from reducing the level of shareholders' equity. 
Generally, most stock repurchases increase stock prices. A 1985 study 
by Merrill Lynch & Co. indicated that stock repurchases of 5 to 10 per- 
cent of acompany 's outstanding shares in the open market outperformed 
the market by 4.7 percent in the first week after the announcement, by 
2.2 percent in the next six weeks, and by more than 3 percent in certain 
later weeks.l5 
Holiday Corp. Implemented Major Repurchases 
Holiday Corp. has bought back about 36 percent of its common stock 
outstanding over the past five years. In January 1985 up to 10 million 
shares were offered for repurchase under the terms of a Dutch auction 
and another 2.5 million shares (or about 10 percent of the total outstan- 
ding shares) has been recently authorized for repurchase. A prime reason 
for these stock repurchases has been Holiday Corp.'s management 
perception that the market had undervalued the company's assets and 
earnings potential. Surely, Holiday Corp.'~ earnings per share and stock 
values have experienced major increases as a result of these stock 
buybacks. 
The 1985 stock repurchase completed by Holiday Corp. was financed 
from borrowings under the terms of a credit agreement with a group of 
major commercial banks. As a result of the increased debt, Holiday's 
long-term debt as a percentage of total capitalization increased to 44 per- 
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cent. In order to facilitate the debt repayment, Holiday Corp. has been 
involved in the sale of some of its hotel properties to syndicated part- 
nerships, maintaining the rights to manage the hotels. These property 
sales accounted for a $2.50 rise in earnings per share for 1985 (out of a 
total of $5.38 earnings per share reported by Holiday Corp. for the year 
1985) as well as for a substantial increase in its return on assets.16 
Industry Sees Other Restructurings 
Other financial restructurings by hospitality firms were initiated in 
order to 
avoid bankruptcy-law filing or liquidation 
strengthen the company's financial position 
Facing the possibility of bankruptcy as a result of the shakeout of its 
pizza restaurant division, Brock Hotels initiated a financial restructur- 
ingin 1985. The planincluded acommon stock right offering toeliminate 
$127 million in long-term debt. Additionally, Brock Hotels extended a 
debenture swap and sold its interest in certain hotel properties in order 
to fit its financialrestructuringprogram. These steps were designed to 
save Brock from bankruptcy. Although Brock Hotels Corp. reported a 
$74 million loss for the year ended December 1985, plans to purchase 
80 percent interest in Park Inns Hotels (which had been operated by 
Brock under the terms of a management agreement) were announced 
by the company after June 30,1986, when it was scheduled to complete 
the financial restructuring. 
Another illustration of a financial restructuring program in the 
hospitality industry is provided by Ramada Inns,17 which had been in- 
volved in a five-year restructuring program (both operational and finan- 
cial) since the early '80s. The program, intended to restore Ramada's 
financial strength and improve its capital base, comprised the selective 
sale of company-owned properties while using the proceeds from these 
property dispositions for debt reductions. To this end, Ramada Inns 
reduced its debt ratio by over 20 percent, selling more than 60 proper- 
ties during the years 1982 through 1985. ~ u r i n g  this ~ a m a d b  1nns 
had to retreat from any type of diversification they may have intended. 
Nonetheless, keeping with the philosophy of d e  emphasizing company- 
owned properties, Ramada placed more emphasis on franchising and 
management contracts. Commencingin 1983, Ramada Inns had a finan- 
cial turnaround, attributed to the restructuring program and to the 
dramatic upturn in operating results of the Atlantic City Tropicana pro- 
perty, which had been responsible for the severe cash flow problems ex- 
perienced by Ramada Inns in 1981. 
Table 1 sets forth major restructurings implemented by hospitality 
firms during the period 1982 to 1986. 
Future Looks Uncertain 
With all the restructurings going on in the hospitality industry today, 
this activity has become a major aspect of the industry. There are a 
number of current issues, however, that should affect the continuation 
of a positive environment for restructuring activity in the future: 
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Table 1 
Selected Restructurings in the Hospitality Industry-1982 to Date 
1983 Collins " ~&A'-'Lqusit~bn'or" ' z.3 
Foods Gino's East 
1983 Denny's Inc. M&A-acquisition of 11.3 
El Pollo Loco Chain 
1985 Denny's Inc. Going private-LBO 752.2 
1983 Diversifoods M&A-Merger of Chart 308 Merger resulted 
Inc. House and Godfather's in the formation 
Pizza chains of a new 
company, 
Diversifoods 
1985 General Divestiture-sale N.A. 
Mills of Darryl's and Casa 
Gallardo Chains to 
W.R. Grace & Co. 
1983 W.R. Grace M&A-acquisition of N.A. 
& Co. T.J. Applebee's and 
Mor Foods 'N Fun 
1985 W.R. Grace M&A-acquisition of 21 
& Co Hungry Tiger chain 
1986 W.R. Grace M&A-acquisition of N. A. 
& Co. significant share of 
American Cafe Chain 
1986 W.R. Grace Divestiture-Restaurant 500 Pending-W.R. 
& Co. group to be taken private Grace would 
in a LBO led by VP of retain 49% 
Restaurant group, interest in 
A. Soliman restaurant group 
1982 Holiday Corp. Divestiture-sale of 96 Final disposal of 
Delta Steamship Lines non-hospitality 
operations 
1981-85 Holiday Corp. Stock Repurchase programs 381.7 
1986 Horn& Operational Restructuring N.A. Losses in 
Hardart Food-service overhaul Bojangle's chain 
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Description Value Comments Year(s) Company 
Divestiture-sale of 
Howard Johnson chain 
to Marriott Corp. 
300 See Marriott sale 
of Howard 
Johnson's lodging 
properties and 
franchised 
restaurants below 
1985 Imperial PLC 
Group 
1981-85 Lifestyles 
Restaurants 
Financial and Operational 
Restructuring 
N.A. Formerly 
Beefsteak 
Charlie's 
M&A deal-sale of Howard 
Johnson's lodging properties 
and franchised restaurants 
to Prime Motor Inns 
235 Part of M&A deal 
for Howard 
Johnson's 
acquisition from 
Imperial Group 
1985 Marriott 
Corp. 
1986 Marriott 
Corp. 
Takeover bid to buy SAGA 
Cog.-Tender offer 
435.2 Pending-Marriott 
primary target is 
SAGA'S contract 
food service 
1983 Pillsbury Co. Divestiture-sale of 
Poppin Fresh Coffee Shop 
to Vicorp. 
1985 Pillsbury Co. 
1986 Pillsbury Co. 
M&A-acquisition of 
Diversifoods 
N.A. Part of 
Diversifoods 
acquisition 
Consolidation of Burger 
King franchised restaurants 
and Godfather's Pizza 
LBO-sale of Chart House N.A. Part of 
Diversifoods 
acquisition 
1986 Pillsbury Co. 
1981-86 Ramada Inns 5 year divestiture program 
financial restructuring 
N.A. Selective sale of 
company owned 
properties in order 
to improve 
financial structure 
by decreasing 
debt 
1985 Ralston 
Purina 
Divestiture-sale of 
Foodmaker in LBO 
450 As a result of sale 
of Foodmaker 
(operator of Jack 
in the Box), 
Ralston Purina is 
no longer involved 
in the food service 
industry 
1985 Restaurant 
Associates 
M&A-acquisition of 
Acapulco Restaurants 
1982 R.J. Reynolds M&A-acquisition of 
Heublin's 
1360 Heublin's 
acquisition 
included 
Kentucky Fried 
Chicken fast-food 
chain 
1983 SAGA Corp. M&A-acquisition of 
Grandy's & Spoon's 
Restaurants 
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Year(@ Company Description Value Comments 
1986 Wendy's M&A-acquisition of 46 
franchisee Restaurant 
Systems, Inc. 
1984 Walt Disney Operational Restructuring N.A. Restructuring 
Co. Corporate changes program was 
triggered by 
takeover attempt 
by financier Saul 
Steinberg. An 
alliance with the 
Bass family of 
Texas helped 
Disney Co. fend 
off Steinberg and 
a subsequent 
attempt by Irwin 
Jacobs 
*The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) restraint on the use of above 
market yield, unrated debt that is below investment grade (better known 
as junk securities) in hostile takeovers and buyouts. The FRB adopted 
arequirement in January 1986 to curb the useof junk securitiesin finan- 
cing these transactions. 
*The role that the controversial "poison pill" device (recently authoriz- 
ed by a Delaware court) and other anti-takeover measures may play as 
deterrents of hostile takeover attempts. 
*A decrease in M&A activity (both friendly mergers and hostile 
takeovers) due to the relatively high stock prices and a falling dollar. Yet 
corporate divestitures are expected to continue to rise as companies 
reevaluate their recent acquisitions and dispose of unwanted units and 
divisions. 
Expression of criticism of the undue risks of leveraged buyouts and 
takeovers that has come from government officials, academicians, and 
business executives whereby these parties have voiced warnings and 
questioned the wisdom of leveraged takeovers and buyouts. Critics have 
become wary that the massive debt associated with these restructur- 
ing moves could jeopardize a company's existence in the event of an 
economic downturn or rising interest rates. 
Because of stock prices reaching record highs, a number of companies 
are expected to cut back on stock repurchase programs. 
*Tax loss carryforwards treated differently under the tax overhaul pro 
posal being considered by Congress. If enacted, it will no longer be ad- 
vantageous to acquire acompany that has experienced losses for the sole 
purpose of reducing the acquiring company's tax liability. In addition, 
there would be a tax imposed on the unrealized appreciation above the 
FIU Hospitality Review, Volume 4, Number 2, 1986
Copyright: Contents © 1986 by FIUHospitality Review. The reproduction of any artwork,
editorial, or other material is expressly prohibited without written permission from
the publisher.
tangible book value of the acquired assets that would affect M&A 
activity. 
.The proposed changes in the tax code pertaining to write-offs 
associated with property and equipment could also have a dampening 
effect on the restructuring phenomenon. Specifically, the proposal would 
repeal the investment tax credit and slow depreciation deductions for 
property and equipment, thus increasing taxes and forcing investment 
decisions to be made for economic substance rather than for its tax 
benefits. In fact, uncertainty concerning the outcome of the tax overhaul 
proposal had already slowed down some M&A activity during 1986. 
Enthusiasm seen in the recent past for taking companies apart and 
putting them back together in different shapes through various forms 
of restructurings is expected to subside in the future. Still, somepoSitive 
motives that gave rise to the present surge of restructuring activity 
should remain critical factors for the hospitality industry, especially the 
urgency for better utilization of a firm's assets and improved managerial 
efficiency. 
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